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  Abstract 
This paper derives the welfare optimal size and intensity of job search assistance programs in 
a general equilibrium model where the labor market is affected by search frictions. Both 
instruments have a priori ambiguous fiscal implications: their direct employment stimulating 
effects broaden the base of the labor income tax and increase revenues, while also incurring 
direct costs. At optimal levels, the policy instruments trade off the positive effects on the 
participants against a marginal increase in taxes, which distorts employment decisions and 
potentially labor market tightness. We find that the higher unemployment insurance benefits, 
the lower is the optimal program intensity. Further, the introduction of a job search assis-
tance program is more likely to raise welfare if it is highly effective at improving participants' 
job search skills, direct program costs are low and if the general level of taxation in the eco-
nomy and thus the labor market participation tax are high. 
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Over the last decades, active labor market programs have been part of most industrialized
countries' policies to bring the unemployed back into work. A considerable share of the
unemployed are assigned to participate in these programs, and total public expenditures
amount to more than 1% of GDP in some OECD countries (OECD, 2006). The most
commonly used policies are job search assistance programs, which shall improve the job
search skills of the unemployed rather than their productivity in a given occupation.
Examples of such measures include training of how to apply for a job, practicing job
interviews, but also counselling and direct referrals to potentially suitable positions by
the public employment service. These activities typically require no long-term instruction
and are therefore relatively cheap compared to other activation measures. However, due
to their high prevalence, their costs for taxpayers nevertheless reach up to about 0.3% of
GDP in several OECD countries (OECD, 2006).
Microeconometric evaluations of existing programs indicate that, in contrast to other
activation measures, job search assistance appears to be eective for a broad range of
participants (see the surveys in Fay, 1996; Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999; Martin
and Grubb, 2001; Kluve and Schmidt, 2002). This means that participants have a higher
transition rate to employment than if they had not attended the program. However, due
to their considerable size, job search assistance programs must be expected to aect also
the labor market situation of non-participants. These eects are captured in macroecono-
metric evaluation studies, which typically analyze the impact of activation measures on
the aggregate unemployment or employment rates. Although the evidence is still scarce,
most existing studies suggest that the macroeconomic implications are often signicant
(see for example Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995; Blundell, Costa Dias, Meghir, and Van
Reenen, 2004; Boone and Van Ours, 2004, and the references therein).
A number of theoretical papers more systematically characterize how job search as-
sistance programs inuence the macroeconomic equilibrium. Calmfors and Lang (1995)
study the implications on wages and employment when the program is targeted at the
long-term versus the short-term unemployed. Distinguishing between high- and low-skilled
workers, Van der Linden (2005) analyzes the eects of a program expansion among the
low-skilled by step-wise endogenization of variables. Both studies stress that general equi-
librium reactions substantially inuence a program's implications on aggregate employ-
ment. Repercussions can even be so severe that the employment rate falls in consequence
of a job search assistance program. This possible outcome is also explicitly taken up
3by Saint-Paul (1998), who identies the conditions under which unskilled workers will
vote for a labor markt program that actually raises unemployment. In a nutshell, by
characterizing the implications of job search assistance programs in a general equilibrium
setting, these papers highlight the dierent channels through which workers' employment
prospects are aected by these policies.
However, when it comes to judging the overall eects and desirability of a policy, the
evaluation criterion that should ultimately be considered is social welfare rather than
employment. The above studies provide only to a reduced extent information about this
measure: Saint-Paul (1998) discusses utility eects for employed low-skilled workers, but
does not capture the welfare consequences for other groups in the economy. Van der
Linden (2005), on the other hand, shows a simulation of aggregate welfare as a function
of program size, but does not, in his theoretical analysis, integrate the dierent eects to
a social welfare measure. This issue is taken up in this paper.
The aim of this paper is to characterize the eects of job search assistance programs
on social welfare and to perform a normative analysis of such a policy. We concentrate
on the two most important characteristics: the size of a program, i.e. the number of
jobseekers attending, and its intensity, which is a measure of the total services provided
to each participant. The optimality criteria for both characteristics are derived in a
general equilibrium framework where the labor market is aected by search frictions and
wages are bargained between rms and workers. Workers are ex ante homogeneous, and
assignment to the job search assistance program is undertaken by the government. We
nd that both instruments should optimally trade o their direct benecial impact on
program participants (or marginal participants in the case of program size) against the
scal implications for taxpayers and ensuing distortions of employment and labor market
tightness. The scal implications consist of two parts: rst, program enlargement or
intensication of course has direct costs, as more instruction and counselling have to be
nanced. Secondly, the direct employment enhancing eect on participants also changes
the government budget. On the one hand, it widens the base of the labor income tax, thus
providing more revenues. On the other hand, it cuts down to the same extent the number
of individuals living on unemployment insurance compensation and thus saves benet
expenditures. This sum of taxes and benets is generally denoted as the participation
tax of the unemployment insurance system and can reach considerable levels, especially
in European countries with traditionally generous welfare states (see Immervoll, Kleven,
Kreiner, and Saez, 2007). Our analysis shows that at the optimal levels of program size
and intensity, their net scal impact is negative, requiring a marginal increase in the
4labor income tax. This not only reduces consumption possibilities of the taxpayers, but
also distorts labor market participation. Depending on the relationship between worker's
bargaining power and the elasticity of the matching function with respect to jobseekers,
the reaction of labor market tightness provoked by a tax rise might also be distortionary.
The design of the job search assistance program also responds importantly to the
unemployment insurance system. As individuals are risk averse, it is optimal to pay out
positive unemployment insurance benets to those who are out of work, although the
distortions generated by the need to nance said expenditures prevent full insurance. The
generosity of unemployment compensation aects the optimal intensity of the job search
assistance program in opposing ways: on the one hand, it raises the participation tax and
inates the scal savings of a more eective program, thus reducing its marginal cost.
Secondly, higher benets diminish job search incentives in general, and therefore also the
gain in employment prospects that can be achieved by higher program intensity, leading
to a reduction in the marginal benet of an intensication. We show that if the Hosios
condition is met, i.e. the wage bargaining power of workers is equal to the elasticity of
the matching function with respect to jobseekers, the second eect is always stronger
than the rst: the optimal intensity of the job search assistance program is lower the
higher unemployment insurance benets. This result connects well with the analysis of
Coe and Snower (1997), who show that active labor market policies are more eective at
reducing unemployment when the unemployment insurance system is not too generous.
Our analysis complements this result by showing that also from a welfare perspective,
having a highly intensive job search assistance program is only optimal if unemployment
compensation is low.
Our analysis also provides insights on the question whether a job search assistance
program should be introduced in the rst place. Program introduction is more likely to
improve social welfare if participation signicantly increases a worker's eectiveness in job
search activity and if the costs incurred by the rst participant are not too high. Further,
we show that if the general level of labor income taxation in the economy is high, implying
that the scal savings in the form of the participation tax compensate the direct program
cost, program introduction is also more benecial. This nding might explain why active
labor market policies are especially prevalent in countries with large social welfare systems
and high levels of taxation, like Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands
or Sweden.
Our paper connects to several strands of the literature. A few recent papers study the
optimal sequence of dierent active and passive labor market policies for the unemployed
5(see Pavoni and Violante, 2007; Wunsch, 2007; Spinnewijn, 2008). However, by focusing
on individual jobseekers only, these papers do not consider the feedback eects on other
agents in the economy, which should be taken into account when designing potentially
large programs. As discussed above, the general equilibrium studies of Calmfors and Lang
(1995) and Van der Linden (2005) focus mainly on a positive analysis of program eects on
employment and thus stop short of deducing normative implications. A notable exception,
albeit focusing on a dierent measure of active labor market policy, is Fredriksson (1999),
who studies the optimal number of participants in public employment programs.
The inuence of the participation tax on both program introduction decisions and
optimal program design also highlights the importance of interactions between dierent
elements of active and passive labor market policies, which has already received some
attention in the literature. For instance, in Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009) the participation
tax of the unemployment insurance system is shown to play also a signicant role in the
determination of optimal wage subsidies (as a means for redistribution). Other studies
emphasizing the interactions between active and passive policies include Van der Linden
(2006), Cardullo and Van der Linden (2006), Coe and Snower (1997) in a general equi-
librium context, and the individual-based contributions of Pavoni and Violante (2007),
Wunsch (2007) and Spinnewijn (2008).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, and Section 3 dis-
cusses the comparative static eects of changes in the government instruments. Section 4
then derives optimal progam size and intensity, and Section 5 concludes. The Appendix
provides some more technical calculations.
2 A Simple Model
The analytical framework is based on a one-period model of a labor market aected by
frictions. This set-up provides a situation where individuals' job search eorts are only
partially successful and there might be a role for a policy that addresses this issue. To
focus on the main mechanisms at work, the model is kept simple in other respects.
The economy contains a mass one of ex ante homogeneous workers. In the beginning,
all individuals are unemployed and have to exert positive search eort to be able to nd
a job. Given their search eort, they can then with a certain probability secure a suitable
job, paying a net wage w   t. Otherwise, individuals end up unemployed and receive
unemployment insurance benets b from the state.
To enhance matching in the labor market and stimulate employment, the government
6runs an active labor market program that provides job search assistance to the unem-
ployed.1 The assignment of unemployed workers to the program is undertaken by the
government, and for the designated individuals participation is mandatory. This is also
very common in practice, where it is mostly at the discretion of the public employment ser-
vice to place the unemployed into dierent programs. The share of program participants
in the whole population, i.e. the size of the program, is denoted by . For participants,
the labor market program leads to an increase in their search eectiveness. Given a level
of search eort sP, their actual search eectiveness then amounts to sP with  > 1.2 The
factor  is thus interpreted as a measure of the intensity of the program. The two dening
characteristics  and  of the job search assistance program are both policy instruments
of the government.
The number of suitable job matches M that are formed in the economy depends on
the number of vacancies V set up by rms and on the eective number of jobseekers
S =   sP + (1   )  sN; (1)
where eective search intensities of the two groups (participants and non-participants)
are multiplied with the relative weight of the respective group in the population. In
accordance with the literature, we assume the matching function to be increasing and
linear homogeneous in the arguments S and V , or specically, M(S;V ) = m0SV 1 . In
what follows, it will be convenient to use the concept of labor market tightness , reecting





In this static model, the employment rate e in the economy is given by the ratio of
successful matches that are formed relative to initial jobseekers, who have mass one:
e = m0S1 . From the point of view of a single individual, the probability p of nding
a job depends on whether he has participated in the job search assistance program. If
he has not taken part in the program, his search eectiveness sN implies a probability of





1We assume that there are no privately run labor market programs in this economy, which is a common
assumption in the theoretical literature. In reality, the policy discussion clearly centers on publicly funded
programs, and many unemployed workers might also be cash constrained to attend programs for which
they would have to pay themselves. Further, some measures of job search assistance programs also contain
monitoring elements, and can therefore be provided only by the public authority.
2The index P stands for program participants, the index N denotes non-participants.
7Analogously, a person who has participated in the program has an eective search intensity





Job search probabilities for the two groups and the aggregate employment rate thus
increase in labor market tightness. Finally, a rm can ll a vacancy with probability
q = m0 , which is decreasing in market tightness.
2.1 Job Search Decision
Individuals determine their job search eort to maximize expected utility. Job search
incurs eort cost '(s), which is an increasing and convex function of s. It is assumed that
both groups of jobseekers have the same eort cost function. Individuals who have not
participated in the labor market program know that they have a probability pN of nding
a job. In this case, they earn a gross wage w, but have to pay a labor income tax of t. If
they end up unemployed (with probability 1 pN), they receive unemployment insurance
benets of b. Their indirect expected utility is thus
EUN = max
sN
pNu(w   t) + (1   pN)u(b)   '(sN); (4)
where u is a standard concave utility function. Optimal job search eort sN is determined
by the condition
m01  [u(w   t)   u(b)] = '0(sN): (5)
The left-hand side shows the marginal benet of increased search eort: as a higher
search eort raises the probability of nding a job, see (2), it becomes more likely that the
individual can move out of unemployment and thus realize the utility dierence u(w t) 
u(b). It is clear that to uphold positive search incentives, this dierence must be positive.
This will be ensured by wage bargaining. The right-hand side shows the marginal eort
cost associated with higher search eort.
For a jobseeker who has participated in the job search assistance program, the prob-
ability of nding a job is given by pP in (3), and expected utility is
EUP = max
sP
pPu(w   t) + (1   pP)u(b)   '(sP): (6)
We thus assume that the time spent in the program does not directly aect a person's
eort cost per unit of job search activity. This seems reasonable given that job search
assistance does not require a very high time input by participants. Therefore a lock-in
8eect cannot occur either in our model, which is often found to be important for more
intensive program types like training (cf. Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch, 2006). Optimal
job search eort sP follows from the condition
m01  [u(w   t)   u(b)] = '0(sP): (7)
Due to program participation, the marginal increase in the job-nding probability is
m01 , which is higher than in the case of a non-participant if the program is eective
( > 1). The convexity of the search cost function then implies that program participants
exert higher search eort than non-participants. Comparing (2) and (3), it follows that
the probability of nding a job is higher for participants for two reasons: rst, they exert
higher search eort, and second, their search eort is more eective due to the multiplier
. We can also show that despite higher eort costs, participants end up with higher
expected utility than non-partipants, EUP > EUN (see Appendix A1). The labor market
program thus creates inequality between participants and non-participants.
2.2 Firms
All rms in the economy produce the same numeraire good. Each rm can only create
one vacancy, which costs k units of the numeraire. With probability q, it then nds a
suitable worker to ll the post and produce y units of output, and pays the worker a gross
wage of w. If it fails to nd a worker, its output is zero. A rm's expected prots are
therefore E() = q(y   w)   k. With free entry, rms enter the economy until expected
prots are driven down to zero:
q(y   w) = k: (8)
The wage is determined by Nash bargaining. Once a successful worker-rm match has
been created, both actors know that they can share a rent. Breaking up the relationship
would leave both with their outside option, which is zero for the rm and u(b) for the
worker as we have assumed one shot matching. With  2 (0;1) denoting the worker's
bargaining power, the wage is determined by
w = argmax[u(w   t)   u(b)]
 [y   w]
1  ;
or implicitly by the rst order condition
u0(w   t)[y   w] = (1   )[u(w   t)   u(b)]: (9)
92.3 Equilibrium
The labor market and the government's budget constraint jointly determine the equilib-
rium in the economy. There are V vacancies posted by all rms together, and workers'
search behavior implies an eective number of jobseekers S. Labor market equilibrium
requires that both labor supply and labor demand are equal to the number of matches
formed with the given vacancies and jobseekers:
e = M (S;V ) = qV: (10)
Aggregate employment is given by the total mass of program participants and non-
participants that were able to secure a suitable job, and is thus a weighted sum of the
respective job-nding probabilities: e = pP + (1   )pN.
The government has two categories of expenditures: rst, it pays out unemployment
insurance benets to the unemployed, which requires outlays of (1 e)b. Second, it bears
the cost of the job search assistance program. This cost is denoted by G(;) and increases
both with program intensity and program size, G > 0 and G > 0. The government's
sole source of revenues is the labor income tax, leading to income et. A balanced budget
requires
(1   e)b + G(;) = et: (11)
The variables b,  and  are the government's policy instruments. Via unemployment
insurance benets, it provides social insurance for those who are not successful on the job
market. As the labor market is aected by frictions, investing in labor market programs
increases employment probabilities of the share of participants  by raising their search
eectiveness via .3
3 Policy Changes and Employment Eects
In this section, we analyze how changes in the size and intensity of the job search as-
sistance program aect the employment probabilities of the two groups of workers and
aggregate employment in the economy. To isolate these eects, we rst derive the general
comparative statics of the model.
3.1 Comparative Statics
Starting out from an equilibrium in the economy, this section determines how changes in
the government's policy instruments b,  and  aect equilibrium values of the endogenous
3Market clearing for the numeraire good is shown in Appendix A2.
10variables. Unless otherwise indicated, the hat notation designates changes in variables
relative to their pre-change equilibrium values.
The gross wage w is determined by the bargaining condition (9). In log-linearizing this




   cu00(c)=u0(c) is the coecient of relative risk aversion of workers and   w t b
w t
captures the relative income dierence between the employed and the unemployed state.
Indexed utilities stand for consumption utility in the employed (uE  u(w   t)) and the
unemployed (uB  u(b)) states. The change in the wage is then given by
^ w = !

^ b + ^ t

; ! 
(1   )(1 + )
1 + (1   )
; 0 < ! < 1; (12)
where ^ b  db=w and ^ t  dt=w. A rise in the unemployment benet b improves the outside
option of workers. For a given wage level, this reduces the income dierence between the
two employment states. Via wage bargaining, a part of this reduction is shifted to rms,
leading to a higher gross wage. Analogously, an increase in the tax t reduces the net
wage and is also partially shifted to rms. Log-linearizing the optimality condition for
job search eort (5) (use again the approximations for uB and u0
B) yields the change in
search eort of non-participants,




^ w   ^ t   (1 + )^ b
i
; (13)
with   '0(s)=('00(s)s) > 0 determining the magnitude of the response of search eort to
a change in the marginal return to searching. The term t  t+b
w captures the participation
tax. This consists of the total scal transfers a worker has to give up when moving from
joblessness into employment, i.e. the unemployment insurance benet he loses plus the
tax he additionally has to pay when earning a wage. Equation (13) shows that as a higher
labor market tightness and a greater income dierence in the two employment states
(expression in brackets) increase the return to job search, they stimulate the search eort
of non-participants. For program participants, the change in search eort follows from
dierentiating (7):




^ w   ^ t   (1 + )^ b
i
: (14)
In addition to the general equilibrium eects that also aect job search of non-participants,
workers who attend the labor market program also raise their search eort in a direct
reaction to an increase in program intensity . As a higher  makes a given level of job
search more eective, thus translating into a higher employment probability, it raises the
11return to searching and consequently stimulates this activity. The eective number of
jobseekers S, dened in (1), nally changes by
S ^ S = (sP   sN)(1   )^  + sP^  + sP^ sP + (1   )sN^ sN; (15)
where the relative change in program size is dened as ^  = d=(1   ). Increases in
program size and intensity directly raise S as they expand the number of workers who
can benet from the program and make search eort more eective, respectively. Indirect
eects come about because of the changes in search eorts within the two groups, as
indicated in (13) and (14).
The number of rms in the economy and thus, for a given S, also labor market tightness
are determined by the zero prot condition (8). Using the matching function to express
the probability of lling a vacancy, q = m0 , implies




A higher gross wage reduces the rms' rent of a successful job match. To rebalance the
zero prot condition, the probability of lling a vacancy must therefore rise, implying a
reduction in labor market tightness.
By the denition of the matching function, an equilibrium on the labor market is
ensured, and changes in employment, ^ e = ^ S + (1   )^ , equate changes in labor demand,
^ q+ ^ V . Last, the tax rate t is endogenously determined to balance the government budget











For a given unemployment rate, higher benet payments b raise expenditures, and must
be nanced by higher taxes on labor income. Similarly, when increased size or intensity
make the labor market program more costly, this must also be covered by higher taxes.
A higher employment rate, on the other hand, reduces the number of benet recipients
and, at the same time, increases the number of taxpayers. Thus, for each additionally
employed, revenues in proportion to the participation tax t are added to the state's
budget, allowing for a corresponding reduction in the labor income tax. Inserting for the
change in employment, and using equations (12)-(16) lets us write the change in the tax


































1   t > 0:
For stability reasons, it is required that 	 > 0. This term captures the behavioral re-
sponses of jobseekers and rms to an increase in the tax that lead to a reduction in
employment. The ensuing erosion of the tax base implies that the tax must be raised by
a greater amount to generate a certain level of revenues than would be required in the
absence of any endogenous behavioral response.
An increase in the unemployment insurance benet b has an unambiguously positive
eect on the tax t. In additition to the direct eect that higher expenditures per unem-
ployed require more nancing already identied in (17), a higher b raises the gross wage
but reduces the net wage and labor market tightness, which dampens search eorts of
both groups of jobseekers. The ensuing reduction in employment then raises the scal
burden for the remaining workers.
An increase in the size  of the job search assistance program has two counteracting
eects on the tax: on the one hand, program expansion has a direct marginal cost G > 0,
which must be covered by higher taxes. On the other hand, as more workers benet from
higher search eectiveness, substituting sP for sN in their probability to nd a job, this
has a direct positive impact on the employment rate. As discussed above, this leads to
scal savings in proportion to the participation tax t, which implies the labor income tax
can be reduced. The total eect of a change in  on t is ambiguous.
A rise in program intensity  has analogous eects on the tax as a change in . The
increase in program costs G > 0 puts an additional burden on the public budget. A more
intensive program, however, raises search eectiveness of participants both directly and
indirectly by stimulating search eort. As a result, program participants face a higher
probability of nding a suitable job, which boosts overall employment. This has again
the positive implications for the scal budget discussed above. The aggregate eect of an
increase in  on the public nances and thus on the tax rate that must balance the budget
is again ambiguous.
133.2 Employment Eects of Changes in Size and Intensity
Having fully determined the comparative statics of the model, we can now isolate the
eects of changes in program size and intensity on the employment probabilities for the
dierent groups and aggregate employment. This lets us relate our results more clearly to
existing studies of macroeconomic eects of job search assistance programs, in particular
to Van der Linden (2005). In this section, we keep the level of unemployment insurance
benets constant.
The program participants' probability pP of nding suitable employment is dened in
(3) and changes according to ^ pP = ^  + ^ sP + (1   )^ . Inserting from (14), (16), (12) and
(18) yields




(1   )^ 
	
: (19)
A higher program intensity directly improves employment prospects as it raises the eec-
tiveness of job search, which also increases the returns to searching and thus stimulates
this activity. On the other hand, a change in intensity also has scal implications as dis-
cussed in (18). When a rise in  requires a higher tax rate, this reduces the net wage and
labor market tightness, leading to a fall in the return to job search and thus in the eort
put to this activity. A fall in labor market tightness also reduces the probability of being
matched to a suitable rm. In aggregate, if  < 0, the indirect eects following from an
increase in program intensity reduce the employment probability of program participants,
thus counteracting the direct positive eects.
In the case of program size , search eort of participants only changes in response
to the equilibrium feedback of the implied change in the tax on the consumption utility
dierential and labor market tightness. This is complemented by the direct eect of labor
market tightness on the employment probability. If program enlargement leads to higher
taxes, the eect on the job-nding probability of those who already participate in the
program is unambiguously negative.
For workers not assigned to participate in the job search assistance program, there are
no direct eects of changes in  and  on either search eort or the probability to nd
a job. The respective equilibrium adjustments follow from inserting (13), (16), (12) and
(18) into ^ pN = ^ sN + (1   )^  and are given by




(1   )^ 
	
: (20)
They are thus the same as the equilibrium feedback eects for program participants.
Finally, we can derive the impact on aggregate employment by dierentiating e = pP +
14(1   )pN and substituting from (19) and (20):
^ e = (1 + )
pP
e






(1   )^     

	
(1   )^ : (21)
On the one hand, an increase in program intensity has a positive direct eect on employ-
ment within the group of participants. They benet from higher eectiveness of their
job search eort, and raise their eort in response. Both eects translate into a higher
employment probability for this group. On the other hand, the scal consequences of a
rise in  and their implications for the equilibrium wage and labor market tightness aect
all individuals in the same way, leading to an employment change that is proportional to
. Aggregate employment eects might thus be positive as long as the scal consequences
do not require too high an increase in the tax rate.
When the number of program participants is raised, this also has a positive direct
eect on employment. As we have seen in Section 2.1, individuals who have attended the
program always have a higher probability of nding employment than non-participants.
Thus, increasing the share of the population entering the program directly increases the
employment rate by the respective dierential. The eects on the public budget and thus
on the tax rate again lead to general equilibrium adjustments of the search eorts and
market tightness, which aect all workers in the same way. Depending on whether the
scal gains of program expansion exceed the scal costs or not, the indirect equilibrium
eects might be positive or negative. When the necessary increase in the tax rate turns
out to be too high, aggregate employment might even be reduced when more jobseekers
enter the program.
These results conrm the ndings of Van der Linden (2005), who shows in simulations
how the positive direct employment eects of an expansion of a job search assistance
programs can be more than compensated when all general equilibrium implications are
considered. Our discussion provides further insights into the theoretical conditions that
must be satised for such an outcome to occur, as it relates the change in employment
fully to the fundamental changes in program characteristics  and .
4 Optimal Program Size and Intensity
Having seen how changes in the size and the intensity of a job search assistance pro-
gram aect employment probabilities of both participants and non-participants, we now
analyze how these instruments should be set optimally. Social welfare W is dened as
aggregate welfare of all individuals, W = EUP + (1   )EUN, and, because population
15size is normalized to one, corresponds to the expected utility of a person before program
assignment has taken place. Dierentiation shows that social welfare is, on the one hand,
aected by changes in the expected utility of the dierent groups of workers, and, on the
other hand, by a changing composition of program participants versus non-participants
in the population:
dW = dEUP + (1   )dEUN + [EUP   EUN](1   )^ : (22)
In order to derive social welfare eects and the optimality criteria for the program charac-
teristics, it is rst necessary to analyze how these instruments aect expected utility of the
dierent groups, which we do in the next subsection. To be able to discuss also the eects
of passive labor market policy on welfare, we again allow for changes in unemployment
insurance benets b. In Subsections 4.2 and 4.3, we then turn to the determination of
optimal program size and intensity, respectively.
4.1 Welfare Eects of Changes in Policy Instruments
In Appendix A3 we show that the change in program participants' expected utility (6)




= pP (w   t   b) ^  +  pP(1   )^  + (1   pP)w(1 + )^ b   pPw^ t;
  
(y   w)(   )
(1   )(1   )
: (23)
The division by marginal utility u0
E implies changes in income equivalent units. The rst
term on the right captures the direct impact of a higher employment probability due to
a more intensive program. As participants become more likely to nd a job and realize
the income dierence between the two employment states, their expected utility increases.
The second term relates to eciency eects of a change in labor market tightness. When
workers' bargaining power  is high relative to the elasticity of the matching function
with respect to jobseekers S,  >  in  , the bargained gross wage is too high from
an eciency perspective. Consequently, too few rms enter the economy, resulting in
ineciently high unemployment. Because a tighter labor market raises employment, an
increase in  then improves eciency in the model. As already shown by Hosios (1990),
when  = , bargaining is ecient and a change in  has no direct implications (  = 0) on
expected utility. The third term shows the impact of a change in unemployment insurance
benets on participants' consumption utility. Due to risk aversion, higher benets imply
a higher than one-to-one gain in income equivalent units. Similarly, when the tax rate
16increases, utility in the employed state is correspondingly reduced, as captured in the last
term in (23).




=  pN(1   )^  + (1   pN)w(1 + )^ b   pNw^ t: (24)
Utility responds in the same manner to changes in , t and b as in the case of program
participants. The only dierence to equation (23) is that program intensity does not
directly aect workers' employment prospects, and thus expected utility, here. Dividing
equation (22) by marginal utility u0
E in the employed state and inserting the results from
(23) and (24), using the equality pP + (1   )pN = e and nally substituting for ^ t from








(1   )^    G^  (25)
 G(1   )^  + (1   e)w^ b +  e(1   )^  + ewt^ e:
In this exposition, we see the direct eects of changes in the policy instruments and their
implied impacts on eciency. Higher program intensity stimulates employment probabil-
ities of participants (as in (23)), and a larger program size lets more individuals attain
expected utility EUP instead of EUN. We know from the discussion in Subsection 2.1 that
this dierence is positive. However, program costs G rise in both program characteristics,
which reduces resources available for individuals. The second term on the second line
of (25) shows the gains from insurance that arise when the unemployed receive a higher
transfer. This gain increases with the risk aversion parameter  and the income dierence
in the two employment states, as captured in . The next expression corresponds again
to the potential ineciency of wage bargaining and the ensuing implications that arise
from a change in market tightness, as discussed below equation (23). The last term in
(25) reects the excess burden of the welfare state. From the workers' point of view, the
participation tax t constitutes the scal cost of the transition from unemployment to em-
ployment and thus negatively aects employment decisions. An increase in employment
e reduces this excess burden and raises social welfare.
4.2 Program Introduction and Optimal Program Size
Using (25), social welfare changes with the size of the job search assistance program








  G +  e(1   )
^ 
d
+ ewt ^ e
d
:
17Inserting for the eect on the employment rate from (21) shows that the direct scal
implications of program enlargement stem from increased revenues in the form of the
participation tax from those workers who are additionally employed because of their pro-




these two eects can be summarized again by using : ewt sP sN
S  G =  ew. Further
summarizing ew + ewt  p
	 = ew

















Apart from the fact that a higher number of participants means that more workers can
enjoy expected utility EUP instead of EUN, all direct and indirect implications of an
increase in  are proportional to the scal net eect . The second term on the right
contains the total employment eects, net of the marginal program costs, and is a negative
function of . The third term captures again the eciency eect due to the change in labor
market tightness, and is in negative proportion to  for  >  and in positive proportion
for  < . However, inserting for   and ! shows that the second and third terms taken
together are always a negative multiple of .
Assuming that W is a concave function of program size , a necessary prerequisite for
the desirability of introducing a job search assistance program is that the derivative of
social welfare with respect to  is positive at  = 0. Several factors make this case more
likely. First, if the program is highly eective, making the participants' chances to nd
employment signicantly higher than nonparticipants', the dierence in expected utilities
EUP  EUN and in eective search intensities sP  sN is large. This improves the welfare
eects of a program introduction. Secondly, small marginal program costs G for the rst
participants also help to justify its implementation.
The third factor is the general level of taxation, which reects the generosity of the
welfare state and the size of other government expenditures. If this level is high it also
implies a large participation tax, and a rise in employment due to the direct eect of the
labor market program on participants thus generates large scal savings. However, these
positive welfare implications are counteracted by the negative impact of high taxes on
search eorts for both groups of jobseekers. As the job search incentives of participants
are reduced to a greater extent, the relative dierence in employment prospects and in
expected utility shrinks. In Appendix A4, we show for the case of  = , i.e. when the
Hosios condition is met, that the rst eect dominates when tax levels are so high that
 < 0. Thus, the welfare eects of program introduction are more benecial if the economy
has a high general level of taxation.
18This nding can to some extent explain why countries with high levels of labor income
taxation like Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands or Sweden run a
large number of active labor market programs at the same time (cf. OECD, 2006). The
initial scal gains that can be generated by employment enhancing policies are then so
large that they can justify the additional outlays for these activation measures.
It is also conceivable that all workers in the economy optimally participate in the
program. Formally, this requires the derivative of social welfare in (26) to be positive
at the maximal size  = 1. In this case, the eectiveness of the program relative to the
marginal costs of program expansion would have to be high even when already many
workers attend the program.
If the derivative of social welfare in (26) is positive at  = 0 and negative at  = 1,













As the term on the left-hand side is positive (see Subsection 2.1), and inserting for  
shows that the sum in brackets is also greater than zero, the net tax eect  of a higher
program size must be positive as well. The marginal program costs should thus be higher
than expected public savings from the direct increase in the employment probability of
the marginal attendant. From a distributional perspective, the search assistance program
creates inequality between the groups of participants and non-participants, and the gain
in expected utility that the marginal participant can obtain compensates for the conse-
quences of a marginal increase in the required tax level and the ensuing distortionary
eects. These include a distortion in the employment decision which is implicit in the
wage bargaining process and is proportional to the participation tax t, and the distor-
tion of labor market tightness if   > 0, i.e.  > . However, if the bargaining power of
workers is comparatively low,  <  )   < 0, employment is ineciently high and its
tax-induced reduction even increases eciency.
This optimality condition can be compared to the recommendations for program as-
signment made in OECD (2005, Chapter 5). It is argued there that programs should
be chosen according to the scal savings they generate in the form of the participation
tax, which should exceed their costs. Our optimality condition for program size makes
clear that when placement ocers decide on assigning a jobseeker to a particular program
that is already in place, they should make sure to consider the marginal program costs
that follow from an additional participant. Depending on the size of the xed costs of
a program, these can be higher or lower than the average costs, which are for instance
19normally reported in cost-benet analyses (cf. Dolton and O'Neill, 2002; Van Reenen,
2004). Further, this decision rule ignores that the job search assistance program has
direct benets for its participants, which improves the expected utility of an individual
before program assignment has taken place. In fact, the rule maximizes expected utility
of non-participants (see equation (24)). From the point of view of a person who does not
yet know if he will be assigned to participate in the job search assistance program, this
would lead to a too small program size.
4.3 Optimal Program Intensity
Now turning to the analysis of optimal program intensity, the derivative of social welfare
with respect to  follows from inserting the changes in the employment rate (21) (note
that pP=e = sP=S and in market tightness (following from (16), (12) and (18)) into (25)













Analogous to the case of program size, the second term on the right captures both the
direct scal consequences of a change in program intensity for taxpayers and the general
equilibrium implications that aect employment. Both eects are proportional to  =
G
ew  t (1 + )
sP
S , as is the impact on eciency due to a change in labor market tightness
(third term). Inserting for   and ! shows that the two terms taken together are a negative
multiple of .
A more intensive labor market program has always a positive direct impact on the
probability to nd a suitable occupation for its participants. They are thus more likely
to gain the consumption utility dierential between the two employment states, which is
approximated by the income dierence w   t   b > 0. However, in spite of this positive
direct eect, very high marginal program costs G that lead to dW
u0
Ed < 0 will prevent the
implementation of an eective job search assistance program, given that social welfare is
concave in . It is then optimal to set both program size and intensity to zero.
In contrast, if program costs are rather small initially, the optimal program intensity
is determined by the condition









As both the left-hand side and the term in brackets are positive, optimality requires that
the net scal eect  is also positive. The marginal gains of a more intensive program,
consisting of the direct increase in employment prospects and, consequently, expected
20utility of participants, are then opposed by the marginal costs in the form of an increase
in the labor income tax. This not only reduces the disposable income of taxpayers, but
also distorts employment and, if   > 0, labor market tightness.
Comparing the eects of program size and intensity on social welfare in (26) and (27)
makes clear that both characteristics aect social welfare through the same equilibrium
channels. Thus, in the event that both instruments optimally take interior values, they
must jointly satisfy the simple condition
EUP   EUN
u0





The left-hand side shows the ratio of the direct marginal eects of an increase in program
size and in program intensity, while the right-hand side shows the ratio of the correspond-
ing direct marginal eects on the tax rate. Thus, if the gain in expected utility of program
participants due to an intensication of the program is higher than the gain in expected
utility for the marginal participant if the program is expanded, it is also optimal to accept
a greater rise in the required tax on labor income in the case of program intensication.
It is also obvious from condition (28) that optimal program intensity depends on the
generosity of the unemployment insurance system. As individuals are risk averse and the
unemployed have no other source of income than insurance benets, it is optimal to pay
out a positive benet b in this model.4 In the interaction of insurance benets and optimal
program intensity, there are mainly two eects going on. On the one hand, a more gener-
ous unemployment insurance system directly reduces the dierence in consumption utility
between employment and unemployment. Consequently, jobseekers curb their search ef-
fort, which reduces the marginal increase in the probability of nding employment that
occurs with a rise in program intensity. Both eects imply a reduction in the marginal
benet of a progam intensication.
On the other hand, also the participation tax rises with the unemployment compen-
sation. As a higher program intensity then directly raises the number of participants who
end up employed instead of out of work, the corresponding scal savings turn out to be
higher. This eect reduces the marginal cost of a more intensive job search assistance
program. By dierentiating condition (28) in Appendix A5, we show that if the Hosios
4Inserting (12)-(16) into (25) shows that optimal unemployment insurance benets are dened by



















The gains from insurance on the left-hand side are opposed by the eciency costs on the right, which
include the distortionary eects of unemployment insurance on job search eorts and employment, and
potentially on labor market tightness. In general, neither no nor full insurance are optimal in the model.
21condition is fullled, i.e.  =  and therefore   = 0, the reduction in marginal benets
dominates the reduction in marginal costs. The optimal program intensity is thus lower
the more generous the unemployment insurance system.
This result connects well to the results of Coe and Snower (1997) on policy comple-
mentarity. They nd that active labor market policies are more eective at reducing
unemployment if insurance benets are reduced at the same time. We complement this
insight by showing that also from a welfare perspective, it is better to have a highly in-
tensive job search assistance program only if the unemployment insurance system is not
too generous.
5 Conclusion
Job search assistance programs aim at improving the job search skills of the unemployed
and are generally found to be among the most eective active labor market policies for a
broad range of participants. Being also relatively inexpensive compared to other activation
measures, in many countries a large share of insured jobseekers are assigned to attend these
programs. It follows from this that in addition to the direct implications of programs on
their participants, their macroeconomic eects must also be expected to be signicant,
and it is all the more important to design these programs in a way that is benecial for
social welfare.
This paper thus develops the optimal rules for determining the two most important
characteristics of such a program, i.e. its size and intensity. It is found that both char-
acteristics have positive direct eects on their participants (or the marginal participants
in the case of program size). They follow from the direct stimulation of attendants' em-
ployment probability, which is generally the focus of the microeconometric evaluation
literature. These positive direct eects are traded o against the program's implications
for the labor income tax, which consist of a positive component in the form of direct
program costs and a negative component in the form of an enlarged tax base due to the
direct employment stimulation of the policy. We nd that the net tax eects of both
instruments should be positive at the margin. This then provokes also a distortion in
employment and might further remove labor market tightness from its ecient level.
The generosity of the unemployment insurance system also importantly inuences the
optimal design of the job search assistance program. High benets generally reduce job
search eorts, but imply higher scal savings when the program manages to improve the
employment prospects of its participants. We show that the rst eect dominates in the
22determination of optimal program intensity: the higher the unemployment compensation,
the less intensive should the job search assistance program be.
In addition, we nd that the implementation of a job search assistance program can
enhance social welfare only if it suciently raises the job nding rates of participants
and is not too costly already for small numbers of participants. Further, if the general
level of labor income taxes is high, for instance due to a large welfare state, a program is
also more likely to improve welfare. The scal gains from the participation tax paid by
the additionally employed are then higher and can compensate for the dilution of search
incentives.
23Appendix
A1 Proof of EUP > EUN for  > 1
Here, we show that EUP > EUN for  > 1. Using the optimality conditions (5) and (7) for
job search eorts, the dierence between indirect expected utilities of program participants
(4) and of non-participants (6) can be written as (remember that pP = sPm01  and
pN = sNm01 ):
EUP   EUN = pP (u(w   t)   u(b))   '(sP)   [pN (u(w   t)   u(b))   '(sN)]
= sP'0(sP)   '(sP)   [sN'0(sN)   '(sN)]:
Further, we know that sP > sN for  > 1. It is therefore sucient to show that the
function (s) = s'0(s) '(s) is monotonically increasing. The derivative of this function
is 0(s) = s'00(s). As we have assumed that the search cost function is strictly convex,
'00(s) > 0, it follows that 0(s) > 0.
A2 Market Clearing
Walras' Law implies that the market for the numeraire good must clear when all budget
constraints are fullled and the labor market is in equilibrium, e = qV . Individuals
spend all disposable income on the numeraire good, leading to private consumption C 
e(w   t) + (1   e)b. Using (11) to eliminate the tax rate and the free entry condition (8)
yields the GDP identity
qyV = C + G + V k:
Total production qyV of the numeraire good is thus used for private consumption C,
public investment G in the labor market program, and for capital input V k to create
vacancies.
A3 Derivation of equation (23)
Dierentiating equation (6) and applying the optimality condition for job search (7) yields
dEUP = pP [uE   uB](^ pP   ^ sP) + pPwu0
E( ^ w   ^ t) + (1   pP)wu0
B^ b:
Using the approximations for uB and u0
B stated above, dividing by u0
E and substituting




= pP (w   t   b)

^  + (1   )^ 

+ pPw( ^ w   ^ t) + (1   pP)w(1 + )^ b
24Finally, inserting from (16), substituting from the wage bargaining condition (9) and
rearranging yields equation (23). Derivation of equation (24) starts out from equations
(4) and (5) and then follows exactly the same steps.
A4 Program introduction
This section shows that program introduction is more likely to be welfare improving if
the overall level of labor income taxes and thus also the participation tax is high. For
simplicity, we assume that  = , implying   = 0. We consider an increase in t, assuming
that the rise in tax revenues is neither spent on unemployment insurance nor on JSA




























From (23) and (24) it follows that dEUP
dt   dEUN
dt =  u0





dt (pP   pN)   wt pP ^ pP pN ^ pN
dt , where we have made use





dt = 1 and
pP ^ pP pN ^ pN
dt =  
 
w(pP   pN), which
follows from inserting ^ pP = ^  + ^ sP + (1   )^  and ^ pN = ^ sN + (1   )^ , applying (13),







E(pP   pN), where we have used 	 = 1   t . The rst three terms on the right of
(A.1) thus just cancel.




E(1   !), which is positive as the utility function u is
concave. To derive d	
dt , we use dt
dt = 1
w(1   t!) and dw




































w(1 t). Using the approximation uB  uE   (w   t   b)u0
E in
the wage bargaining condition (9) and the assumption  =  lets us summarize the terms
in brackets on the second line by   t
1 t. Thus, the rst two terms in (A.2) are negative,
while the third is positive. To derive the sign of the overall expression, rearrange (A.2) to
summarize all terms that are not multiplied by , while again using the approximation of




























1 +   

1 + 
(1   )(1   !)

< 0:
25Clearly, as 0 < !; < 1, the third term is also negative and the whole derivative is smaller
than zero. Consequently, the sign of d2W







In situations of program introduction when we have a high participation tax, leading to
 < 0, the eect on welfare is thus more benecial than when the participation tax is low.
A5 Dependence of optimal  on b
This section shows that optimal program intensity  decreases in b when  = , implying
  = 0. Note that in the optimality condition (27), we used the approximation uE  uB 
u0
E(w   t   b). Resubstituting leads to the condition












 being chosen to maximize social welfare W implies that d




























In deriving the rst term on the right in (A.4), use equations (14), (16), (12), dt
db = 
	 and
the approximation of u0
















where we have subsituted ew
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, where we have used    cu00(c)=u0(c). The









= 0. By applying (A.3) and
uE uB  u0
E(w t b), this term can be written as
d(ew)




the rst three terms on the right in (A.4) yields
d
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As  > 0 at the optimal level of , the whole expression is negative. Finally, to determine
the sign of d	
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where we have also used the wage bargaining condition (9) together with the approxima-
tion uE  uB  u0
E(w t b) and  = . The expression in the rst row is negative, while
the sign of the expression in the second line is ambiguous. By summarizing all terms that
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Thus, also the last expression in (A.4) is negative and we have d









i.e. optimal program intensity decreases with the level of unemployment insurance benets.
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